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ABSTRACT
Lawyering has changed dramatically in the past century, but
scholarly and regulatory models have failed to keep pace. Because
these models focus exclusively on the “practice of law” as defined by
the profession, they ignore many types of work that today’s lawyers
perform and many sources of ethical tension they encounter. To
address these shortcomings, I examine significant twentieth- and
twenty-first-century social dynamics that are fundamentally altering
contemporary lawyers’ work by broadening and blurring the
boundary between law and business. Within the resulting boundary
zone, a growing number of lawyers occupy roles for which legal
training is valuable but licensure is not required. I argue that the
ambiguity surrounding these roles—regarding what constitutes legal
practice, what roles lawyers play, and what professional obligations
attach—creates opportunities for abuse by individual lawyers and for
ethical arbitrage by sophisticated corporate clients. The proliferation
of these roles gives rise to key ethical tensions, ignored by existing
models of the profession, that threaten to extinguish the profession’s
public-facing orientation in favor of its private interests. I conclude
that we cannot effectively understand and regulate the twenty-firstcentury legal profession until we move beyond the rigid constraints of
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existing models and begin to study the full range of roles and work
settings—both in and out of practice—that today’s lawyers occupy.
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INTRODUCTION
1

On August 24, 2005, nine individuals were indicted for their
involvement in the KPMG tax scandal, described as the “largest tax2
evasion scheme in U.S. history.” These nine individuals played a
central role in designing and marketing fraudulent tax shelters that
generated $12 billion in phony losses and cost the Internal Revenue
3
Service $2.5 billion in lost taxes. Although only one of the nine was
4
technically practicing law, five others were licensed lawyers. These
five lawyers were out of practice but very much in business.
The lawyer wrongdoing and resulting harm in this example are
extreme, but the pervasive presence of lawyers throughout corporate

1. Sealed Indictment at 5–6, United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y 2007)
(05 Crim. 888), 2005 WL 6142978.
2. Terry Frieden, Former KPMG Executives Indicted, CNN MONEY (Aug. 30, 2005, 8:20
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/30/news/fortune500/kpmg. KPMG later entered into a
deferred prosecution agreement and agreed to pay $456 million in penalties. Id.
3. Id. These nine men were employed by KPMG in a wide range of roles, including as
high-level tax executives, operators of subsidiary shell companies, and as purportedly
independent advisors. Sealed Indictment, supra note 1, at 3–5.
4. Sealed Indictment, supra note 1, at 3–5.
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life has become routine. For several decades, lawyers have been
moving out of law firms and courtrooms and into new legal practice
5
settings in business and government. Today, they are increasingly
moving out of practice and into quasi-legal roles, defined loosely as
roles at the intersection of law and business for which legal training is
6
valuable but licensure is not required. Although lawyers working in
these roles exert considerable influence on the shape and orientation
of the legal profession, scholars and regulators underestimate their
7
significance. Even as the profession has grown, changed, and
fractured in recent decades, the prevailing models of the profession
have remained fixed—structured around the fiction of crisp and clear
boundaries between law and business.
The first of these models, the traditional unitary model, lies at
8
the foundation of the profession’s current regulatory system. It posits
a single, unified profession comprised of lawyers who share more
9
commonalities than differences. Based on these commonalities, the
model prescribes, and our current system has, a single, broadly
10
applicable code of conduct. The second of these models, the

5. See, e.g., Robert L. Nelson, The Futures of American Lawyers: A Demographic Profile
of a Changing Profession in a Changing Society, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 345, 355, 369 (1994).
6. Broadly speaking, the term “quasi-legal role” encompasses any job for which a law
degree and licensure are advantageous but not required, whether or not the job is associated
with legal practice and the legal profession. The term therefore encompasses, but is not
necessarily limited to, what the National Association for Law Placement (NALP) refers to as
JD Advantage jobs. See Employment for the Class of 2011—Selected Findings, NAT’L ASS’N FOR
L. PLACEMENT 2–3 (2012), http://www.nalp.org/uploads/Classof2011SelectedFindings.pdf
(“Employment in business accounted for 18.1% of jobs, the highest that NALP has measured,
and up from 15.1% for the Class of 2010. The percentage of jobs in business had been in the 10–
14% range for most of the two decades prior to 2010, except in the late 1980s and early 1990s
when it dipped below 10%. About 29% of these jobs were reported as requiring bar passage,
and about 37% were reported as jobs for which a JD was an advantage.”); see also Class of 2011
National Summary Report, NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. PLACEMENT (July 2012), http://www.nalp.org/
uploads/NatlSummChart_Classof2011.pdf (reporting these figures in table format).
7. See infra Part I.
8. See Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335, 385–86 (1994)
(“[T]he Model Rules continue the Model Codes’ basic approach of considering lawyers’ duties
to be uniform, whatever role the lawyer plays.”).
9. See David B. Wilkins, Some Realism About Legal Realism for Lawyers: Assessing the
Role of Context in Legal Ethics, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN
CONTEXT 25, 26 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012) (“The organized bar has long
conceived of the practice of law as fundamentally a ‘generalist’ profession in which differences
among lawyering roles are largely unimportant with respect to the task of defining professional
norms, or even assessing professional competence.”).
10. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 393–403 (1988)
(“[T]he standard conception . . . accurately represents leading themes in the official rules of the
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segmented model, recognizes and accounts for the growing
fragmentation and specialization in lawyers’ work. It posits a
collection of discrete subprofessions, each ideally governed by a
11
distinct regulatory regime and a context-specific code of conduct.
These models have a common shortcoming. Both focus narrowly
and exclusively on the “practice of law,” which encompasses work
previously subsumed within the profession’s jurisdiction and included
within its monopoly. As a result, both models ignore one of the most
significant sources of change and ethical tension in the contemporary
legal profession: the evolving relationship between legal practice and
business practice.
In this Article, I argue that we cannot understand the shape and
orientation of today’s legal profession without understanding the
bar’s changing approach to defining and defending its boundaries.
The organized bar was once intent on drawing sharp distinctions
between law and business, but the rise of the regulatory state changed
12
the playing field. As regulation came to pervade society, new kinds
of work and roles proliferated. Law and business grew together, and a
murky and ambiguous boundary zone replaced the once-crisp
demarcation between the two. Today’s quasi-legal roles, embraced by
many lawyers and encouraged by the organized bar, exist in this
broadened and blurred boundary zone in which legal training and
licensure are valuable but professional ethical obligations are unclear.
Ambiguity surrounding lawyers’ work in this quasi-legal zone—
regarding what constitutes legal practice, what role a lawyer plays,
and when professional rules attach—gives rise to key ethical tensions
ignored by existing models of the profession. This ambiguity creates
opportunities for abuse by individual lawyers who seek to evade
ethical obligations and for ethical arbitrage by sophisticated corporate
clients who seek to access legal expertise without the strictures of
professional regulation. It calls into question the profession’s
legitimacy, and it suggests a worrisome answer to a question
frequently asked in the wake of the KPMG tax shelter incident and

American legal profession.”); see also Keith R. Fisher, The Higher Calling: Regulation of
Lawyers Post-Enron, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1017, 1020–36 (2004) (“[I]ndeterminacy and
lack of accountability arise in large part from the dominant . . . paradigm of legal ethics that
informs the bar-drafted rules of professional conduct.”). See generally infra Part I.A.
11. See David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer,
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1149–50 (1993). See generally infra Part I.B.
12. See infra Part I.C.
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other recent scandals: “Where were all the lawyers?” The
uncomfortable answer is that the lawyers were there amidst the
scandal, but they had abandoned their previous roles as
intermediaries between state and society in favor of new roles
straddling law and business. Their work in these quasi-legal roles
represents a new and thus far unrecognized domain in lawyers’
corporate work.
This Article builds upon existing models of the profession to
account for the proliferation of lawyers’ quasi-legal work. I begin in
Part I by reviewing and critiquing existing models of the profession. I
then demonstrate that the traditional and segmented models each
overlook a significant historical trend influencing the work of today’s
lawyers: the emergence of a quasi-legal boundary zone between law
and business. In Part II, I analyze core ethical tensions that arise from
the work of licensed lawyers in quasi-legal roles—work that is
excluded from existing regulatory regimes of professional regulation.
I argue that the proliferation of quasi-legal roles permits sophisticated
corporate clients to reap the benefits of the profession’s monopoly
while the public bears a disproportionate share of the burdens. In
Part III, I call for new forms of professional regulation to address
these tensions. I propose that by combining insights from the
traditional and segmented models, we can overcome the weaknesses
of each, bringing clarity to lawyers’ work and ethical obligations in
quasi-legal roles. There is room—as well as need—for broad ethical
principles that bind all lawyers together, alongside context-specific
regulations that govern particular practice areas and work settings.
I. EXISTING MODELS OF THE PROFESSION
The traditional model of the legal profession, eschewed by most
14
scholars but still espoused by bar leaders, posits a single profession

13. The question was first posed by Judge Stanley Sporkin in Lincoln Savings & Loan
Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990), but has been repeated many times since. See,
e.g., Ashby Jones, Where Were the Lawyers?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan. 2, 2007, 8:52 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/01/02/where-were-the-lawyers; Sarah Kellogg, Financial Crisis
2008: Where Were the Lawyers?, DCBAR (Jan. 2010), http://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/
publications/washington-lawyer/articles/january-2010-financial-crisis.cfm; Richard Moorhead,
Hackgate:
Where
Were
the
Lawyers?,
LAW.
WATCH
(July
10,
2011),
http://lawyerwatch.wordpress.com/2011/07/10/hackgate-where-were-the-lawyers.
14. Leaders of the ABA and state bars have long maintained that a single set of ethical
rules and a single regulatory regime are appropriate for all segments of the profession. See
Zacharias, supra note 8, at 385–86.
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regulated through barriers to entry and a uniform code of conduct. In
contrast, current scholarship advances a segmented model, comprised
of a number of subprofessions, each ideally governed by a distinct,
context-specific code of conduct. Although these two approaches
diverge significantly in their descriptive and prescriptive positions,
they address the same normative question of how to organize and
regulate lawyers’ work so as to achieve balance among the
profession’s tripartite obligations to clients, the state, and the public.
In this Part, I review these two models and then address a common
and fundamental shortcoming: their narrow focus on the practice of
law. Because of this focus, both models ignore the emergence and
significance of the hybrid, quasi-legal zone between business and law.
A. The Traditional Model
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as
lawyers were asserting themselves as an organized profession, bar
leaders developed and promoted the traditional or unitary model of
15
the legal profession. At its base is a social contract: in exchange for
special expertise, heightened ethical standards, and devotion to the
public interest, lawyers enjoy self-regulatory authority and a state16
granted monopoly over legal practice.
Early bar leaders explained that these necessary features of
17
professional status supported the bar’s ideal role in society.
Monopoly power allowed the bar to limit entry so as to protect the
public from unqualified, incompetent, and unethical practitioners.
Self-regulatory authority allowed the bar to maintain autonomy from
both the state and private interests so as to protect lawyers’
18
independent legal judgment.
In theory, these features of

15. See id. at 338 (“The American Bar Association . . . attempted to set a uniform standard
for lawyer conduct in . . . 1908 . . . .”).
16. See Deborah L. Rhode, Lawyers as Citizens, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1323, 1323–24
(2009).
17. See id.; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV.
1, 3 (1981) (“Since its inception in the early 1930s, the bar’s campaign against the unauthorized
practice of law has been characterized by its partisans as a selfless enterprise actuated solely by
considerations of ‘public interest and welfare.’” (quoting Comm. on Evaluation of the Nat’l
Conference on the Unauthorized Practice of the Law, Address at the National Conference on
the Unauthorized Practice of Law (May 25–26, 1962), in AM. BAR ASS’N, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW: TEXT OF ADDRESSES OF SPEAKERS
153 (1962))).
18. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. 11 (2013).
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professionalization prepared and empowered the bar to ensure
qualified, competent, and ethical lawyers who bolstered the rule of
law, mediated between state and society, and protected individual
19
rights.
The organized bar developed three interlocking regulatory
elements to effectuate this vision of the profession: barriers to entry,
statutes governing the unauthorized practice of law, and codes of
ethical conduct. In the early decades of the twentieth century, bar
leaders pursued the first of these elements by convincing state
licensing authorities to adopt the American Bar Association’s (ABA)
20
entry standards. The ABA’s requirements included law school
education, bar examination passage, and approval by a character-andfitness committee. These requirements promoted professional unity
by ensuring that all lawyers would share common training,
21
commitments, and acculturation. Throughout much of the twentieth
century, they also sanctioned homogeneity by impeding the inclusion
22
of immigrants, minorities, and women.
While promoting uniformity within the profession, bar leaders
drew sharp boundaries around its edges through the second
interlocking element of regulation: the unauthorized-practice-of-law
23
statutes. Bar leaders first persuaded state legislatures to criminalize
the practice of law by unlicensed practitioners and then formed
24
enforcement committees to identify and pursue violations. Bar
leaders cited three principal explanations for their efforts: the
specialized and state-constitutive nature of legal work, lawyers’
unique competency to engage in that work, and the importance of

19. See id.; Evan A. Davis, The Meaning of Professional Independence, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1281, 1281–82 (2003).
20. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 47 (1989).
21. See id. at 47, 223.
22. JERALD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 108 (1976). Subsequently, the bar opened
its doors to members of these previously excluded groups, but continued to control entry to
ensure quality and to limit competition. As Professor Bruce Green has explained, “over time,
the effect of the bar association rulings became less to protect the professional elite from lowerclass competitors than to protect all lawyers against competition from nonlawyers . . . and,
beyond that, to expand lawyers’ turf.” Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on
Multidisciplinary Practice: Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the
Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1144 (2000).
23. See JOHN F. SUTTON, JR. & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LAWYERS 231–41 (1989); Rhode, supra note 17, at 3.
24. Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An Overview of
the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581, 2583–84 (1999).
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protecting the public from incompetent and unethical legal service
25
providers.
The third interlocking element of regulation entailed the
promulgation of a single, broadly applicable code of conduct. In 1908,
the ABA issued the Canons of Ethics (Canons), its first official
26
statement on appropriate standards of professional conduct. The
Canons expressed a single vision of lawyers’ work based on
27
courtroom practice. They articulated strong duties of confidentiality,
loyalty, and care to clients, while also recognizing lawyers’ obligations
to the state as officers of the court and to the public as supporters of a
28
just legal system. The ABA premised the Canons on what Professor
Fred Zacharias termed the “fictions of symmetry”—the notion that
all lawyers are equally competent, that all clients are similar, and that,
as a result, “all lawyers should be governed by the same rules,
29
regardless of whom they represent or in what context.”
By focusing on the readily observable and carefully regulated
context of the courtroom, the Canons presented a coherent and
compelling picture of how the bar’s system of self-regulation balanced
lawyers’ competing duties to clients, the state, and the public. In the
courtroom, lawyers express their duties to clients through zealous
advocacy. They express their duties to the state by supporting court
proceedings and following court procedures. And they express their
duties to third parties and the public by complying with prescribed
standards of fair dealing in interactions with opposing and third
30
parties. By drawing attention to the courtroom, the bar thus
demonstrated how its system of self-regulation balanced lawyers’

25. See generally DORIS MARIE PROVINE, JUDGING CREDENTIALS: NONLAWYER JUDGES
POLITICS OF PROFESSIONALISM (1986). These considerations continue to justify
unauthorized-practice-of-law (UPL) statutes today. See, e.g., Denckla, supra note 24, at 2594
(“The notion that permitting nonlawyers to practice law would harm clients rests on two basic
assumptions: (1) under UPL rules, lawyers are more likely to protect client interests than
nonlawyers would without UPL rules; and (2) clients would be worse off without UPL rules.”).
26. LUBAN, supra note 10, at 393–403; see Fisher, supra note 10, at 1040.
27. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 54 (1986) (“[The Canons] speak
of a kind of law practice that was carried on almost entirely in the courtroom.”).
28. CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS pmbl., Canons 1, 6 (1908).
29. Fred C. Zacharias, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice: Confronting
Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 838
(2002).
30. Though it was not entirely necessary to focus on the courtroom context to appreciate
this, lawyers’ public orientation was also expressed through their role in the overall function of
litigation as a means of fair and effective dispute resolution.
AND THE
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tripartite duties in furtherance of rule-of-law values. In theory if not
in practice, represented litigants—rich or poor, urban or rural,
sophisticated or unsophisticated—could enter the courtroom on equal
footing, knowing that regardless of power or personal circumstances,
32
the law would treat them equally.
Even at the height of professionalization, therefore, the unitary
model was likely a mix of reality and rhetoric. Most lawyers at the
33
time were, in fact, courtroom lawyers, but a nontrivial number also
engaged in contract drafting, estate planning, and basic transactional
34
work. Notwithstanding these varied roles, it served the profession’s
interests to promote lawyers as uniform and unified, bound together
35
by common training, work, and professional norms. Doing so
provided a powerful justification for the profession’s monopoly over
legal practice. It also drew attention to the public forum of the
courtroom, where the profession’s system of regulation was relatively
effective in balancing and constraining lawyers’ competing duties.
Throughout the twentieth century and even to today, bar leaders
continue to embrace this traditional unitary model. Although the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) now govern in
place of the Canons, the ABA and state bars insist that a single set of
ethical rules and a single regulatory regime are appropriate for all

31. The “rule of law” is an ambiguous and contested phrase, used here to refer to systemwide values created by a legal framework “based on law, not men”—values that include a
moderate state, a strong and engaged civil society, and basic individual freedoms. See Terence
C. Halliday, Lucien Karpik & Malcolm Feeley, The Legal Complex in Struggles for Political
Liberalism, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM 1, 10–12 (Terence C. Halliday, Lucien
Karpik & Malcolm M. Feeley eds., 2007). The bar’s interlocking elements of regulation were
advanced as supporting these values by providing society with a cadre of legal professionals who
had special expertise, heightened ethical standards, and a commitment to the public interest,
and who would ensure the integrity of court proceedings and of the legal system writ large.
32. See Rhode, supra note 16, at 1324
33. See WOLFRAM, supra note 27, at 54; Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Ethical Standards of the Bar,
Address at the American Bar Association Regional Meeting 4 (Oct. 22, 1964), available at
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/powellspeeches/7 (“In 1908 the typical lawyer was a
general practitioner, usually alone, who divided his time between the courts and a family type of
office practice.”).
34. See WOLFRAM, supra note 27, at 54 n.26.
35. The “principle of regulatory uniformity” has been referred to as “‘one of the legal
profession’s most important constitutive beliefs’ and also its ‘most dramatic delusion.’” Scott R.
Peppet, Lawyer’s Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration: The End of the Legal
Profession and the Beginning of Professional Pluralism, 90 IOWA L. REV. 475, 503 (2005)
(footnote omitted) (quoting Wilkins, supra note 11, at 1148; Zacharias, supra note 29, at 841).
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36

segments of the profession. Notwithstanding limited amendments
37
addressing transactional work, these governing codes of conduct
38
continue to focus overwhelmingly on litigation. The ABA goes a
step further, urging lawyers to strive to improve the profession, which
39
it describes as unitary. For decades, however, the bar’s actual and
rhetorical push toward uniformity has belied significant change and
growing complexity in our legal system.
B. The Segmented Model
During the 1980s and 1990s, even as bar leaders continued to
embrace the traditional model, commentators began to question it.
Social scientists observed that significant twentieth-century changes
in law and society had prompted an expansion and corresponding
40
diversification of lawyers’ work. They placed particular emphasis on
the emergence and growth of two organizational forms, which
generated new kinds and an increased volume of legal work: the large

36. See Zacharias, supra note 8, at 386. Specialty bar associations and lawyers’ groups, such
as the American College of Trusts and Estates Lawyers and the American Association of
Matrimonial Lawyers, have formulated commentary on the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (Model Rules) to tailor them to specific areas of law, but neither the ABA nor state
bars have adopted or endorsed this type of context-specific guidance. See Lynn Mather & Craig
A. McEwen, Client Grievances and Lawyer Conduct: The Challenges of Divorce Practice, in
LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT, supra note 9, at 63, 63.
37. The current Model Rules ostensibly recognize that not all lawyers are litigators. They
include provisions that address the lawyer as advisor, see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
RR. 1.2, 1.4, 2.1 (2013), negotiator, see id. R. 4.1, and mediator, see id. R. 2.2. Rule 1.13
addresses the particular challenges of entity representation. See id. R. 1.13. The preamble also
purports to recognize the significance of context. See id. pmbl., para. 9 (distinguishing the
various functions of a lawyer and suggesting that contentious ethical issues “be resolved through
the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles
underlying the Rules”). Still, the Model Rules perpetuate the traditional approach of viewing
the profession as unitary and the duties of lawyers as uniform, based on litigation. See
Zacharias, supra note 8, at 385–86.
38. See Fisher, supra note 10, at 1042–43 (describing the Model Rules’ reliance “exclusively
on the adversarial litigation role model” and “the primacy of trial lawyers’ . . . concepts of
zealous advocacy of, and unswerving loyalty to, the client”).
39. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl.
40. See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 1 (Nw. Univ. Press rev. ed. 1994) (1982) [hereinafter HEINZ &
LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS]; JOHN P. HEINZ, ROBERT L. NELSON, REBECCA L.
SANDEFUR & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF
THE BAR 7–8 (2005) [hereinafter HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS]. As many scholars have
noted, there has always been some diversity within the profession. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra
note 27, at 54–55. Accordingly, these twentieth-century developments increased and changed—
but did not necessarily create—variation among lawyers’ roles and work.
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commercial enterprise and the administrative bureaucracy. The
former called upon lawyers to address novel and complex corporate
restructurings, tax and antitrust issues, and bond offerings; the latter,
to undertake new types of individual and institutional representations
42
associated with the rise of the regulatory state.
The bar responded by changing the structure of legal education
to produce more lawyers and by developing the large, differentiated
43
law firm to maximize efficiency. Many newly trained lawyers moved
out of traditional roles as courtroom litigators and into countless new
44
roles as transactional lawyers and government advisors. During this
shift, some lawyers were pulled into new roles, while others pushed
45
out to them. In both cases, the bar incorporated much of this new
corporate and government work within the definition of legal
46
practice, dramatically expanding the profession’s jurisdiction.
Observing these changes in an influential 1982 study, sociologists
John Heinz and Edward Laumann concluded that “the simple view of
47
the bar as a single, unified profession no longer fits the facts.” They
theorized that the late twentieth-century bar had fragmented into two
hemispheres, differentiated by the type of client. In the “personalplight” hemisphere, lawyers who generally came from lower
socioeconomic backgrounds provided legal services to individuals and
48
small businesses. In the “corporate hemisphere,” by contrast, elite
41. ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF
EXPERT LABOR 248 (1988).
42. See id. at 248–49 (describing how lawyers’ work grew increasingly diverse as lawyers
engaged in activities “ranging from personal matters associated with the welfare state’s
involvement in housing and education to the corporate business generated by the state’s
regulatory intrusions into the economy”).
43. See id. at 252–53.
44. See PATRICK SCHMIDT, LAWYERS AND REGULATION: THE POLITICS OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 13 (2005); Nelson, supra note 5, at 355, 369.
45. See Michael J. Powell, Professional Innovation: Corporate Lawyers and Private
Lawmaking, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 423, 429–49 (1993) (discussing the development of the
poison pill and noting that “law firms did not passively wait for clients to ask them for
prescriptions for a poison pill but proactively marketed their particular brand through client
memoranda and presentations to boards of directors”). See generally Yves Dezalay, The Big
Bang and the Law: The Internationalization and Restructuration of the Legal Field, THEORY
CULTURE & SOC’Y, June 1990, at 279 (documenting corporate lawyers’ entrepreneurial
activities in promoting new products and services to clients, with the effect of further increasing
demand and further expanding their fields of influence).
46. See ABBOTT, supra note 41, at 249 (“Potential legal jurisdictions in [the late nineteenth
century] . . . grew rapidly.”).
47. HEINZ & LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS, supra note 40, at 1.
48. Id. at 330.
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law school graduates and members of influential law firms
represented corporations, labor unions, and other complex
49
organizational clients.
Legal commentators in the 1990s built on Heinz and Laumann’s
descriptive work with normative projects addressing professional
regulation. In a series of seminal articles, Professor David Wilkins
criticized the bar’s continued reliance on the traditional model of a
50
unitary profession. He accepted the value of conduct rules in
balancing lawyers’ competing obligations to clients, the state, and the
public, but he questioned the ability of a single code to cover diverse
areas of legal practice. Wilkins therefore proposed a system of
51
context-specific rules to govern different practice areas. Such a
system, he argued, could preserve the benefits of professional
regulation while addressing the increasing fragmentation and
52
specialization of the bar.
To illustrate how to develop context-specific rules, Wilkins
examined the charges that the Office of Thrift Supervision brought
against the law firm Kaye Scholer, in 1990, for failure to disclose
problems with the underwriting and investment practices of its client,
53
Lincoln Savings & Loan. Wilkins suggested that, because lawyers
who represent federally insured savings institutions play a critical role
in maintaining the safety and soundness of the banking system, they
should owe correspondingly heightened duties of candor to the
54
tribunal to safeguard the public interest. He argued, however, that

49. Id. at 328. Professor John Heinz, Professor Edward Laumann, and two new
collaborators set out to update their study in the 1990s. In the findings they published in 2005,
they concluded that the two hemispheres had grown further apart, as it had become increasingly
uncommon for lawyers to cross between them. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS, supra note 40,
at 8. They also reported that the corporate hemisphere had grown at a much faster pace than
the personal-plight hemisphere but had begun to fragment based on the area of law and the
requisite skill specialization. Id. at 7–8.
50. See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468 (1990)
[hereinafter Wilkins, Legal Realism]; Wilkins, supra note 11; David B. Wilkins, Who Should
Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992).
51. He referred to these rules as “middle-level rules” to clarify that he was not advocating a
contextual approach taken to an extreme—with each case taken entirely on its own facts and
circumstances. See Wilkins, Legal Realism, supra note 50, at 515–19. Instead, he was proposing
“a set of ‘middle-level principles’ that both isolate and respond to relevant differences in social
and institutional context while providing a structural foundation for widespread compliance in
the areas where they apply.” Id. at 516 (footnote omitted).
52. See id. at 515–19.
53. See Wilkins, supra note 11, at 1151–59.
54. See id. at 1181–82.
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the level of public obligation should vary with the type of
engagement. He explained that lawyers need more leeway to
advocate zealously for clients when litigating than when offering
55
advice and guidance in a nonadversarial context.
Wilkins acknowledged the difficulty of developing contextspecific rules and enforcement mechanisms. In particular, he noted
the definitional difficulty of determining which differences mattered
for what purposes and the jurisdictional difficulty of determining
56
which rules applied to what conduct. Notwithstanding these
difficulties, he emphasized the importance of the undertaking for the
future of the profession. He therefore called for sustained study to
57
explore differences between various practice settings.
Many scholars answered the call. Some considered the broader
systemic implications of specialization and fragmentation and
concluded that the unitary legal profession was a relic. For example,
Keith Fisher contended that “[t]o talk in the 21st century about ‘the
legal profession’ is to speak of a nonexistent, monolithic construct
that is, at best, a holdover of 19th century images of small-town or
58
local law practice.” Professor John Leubsdorf wrote of the
“centrifugal movement” that led to the current fragmented profession
59
and predicted that the profession would fragment even further.
Other scholars explored specific practice settings, including
large-firm practice, transactional practice, in-house advising,
60
government lawyering, and cause lawyering. In each context, they

55. See id. at 1183–84. Wilkins also argued that the implicated legal market was relevant in
designing and imposing appropriate sanctions. With respect to the Kaye Scholer case, he
concluded that the Office of Thrift Supervision’s imposition of a temporary order to cease and
desist was insufficiently sensitive to its fatal impact on a large law firm operating in a highly
competitive market. See id. at 1214–15.
56. See id. at 1216–18 (“[One objection], which I call the spillover critique, argues that
context-specific rules will inevitably reach beyond their intended scope.”).
57. See id. at 1216 (“My purpose here is to spark, rather than to resolve, the debate over
exactly how context should be incorporated into regulatory policy for thrift lawyers.”). In 2012,
Wilkins returned to these questions, observing that they are growing increasingly complicated
“as lawyers, clients, and legal norms increasingly cross established contextual boundaries.”
Wilkins, supra note 9, at 40. Again, he called for further scholarly attention and research. Id. at
25.
58. Fisher, supra note 10, at 1042.
59. See John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 959, 962 (2009).
60. See, e.g., Audrey I. Benison, The Sophisticated Client: A Proposal for the Reconciliation
of Conflicts of Interest Standards for Attorneys and Accountants, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 699,
721–23 (2000); Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost
of Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1714–15 (2008);
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explored the conditions of lawyers’ work and decisionmaking and
described current sources of regulation. Many scholars also proposed
context-specific rules for particular practice specialties, including
61
bankruptcy, estate planning, mass torts, securities, and employment.
These scholars advanced a segmented model of the legal profession
that continued to embrace the profession’s mediating role between
state and society, while breaking free of the traditional model’s
exclusive focus on litigation.
C. Problematizing the Models
Although the segmented model provides important insights into
ethical tensions that arise from specialization, it shares a fundamental
flaw with the traditional model. Both models focus narrowly on
established areas of legal practice, assuming that a static boundary
exists between legal practice and business practice. As a result,
neither model accounts for one of the most significant sources of
change and ethical tension facing the profession today—the
emergence of a robust but ambiguous boundary zone between law
and business. Within this zone, an increasing number of licensed
lawyers engage in hybrid quasi-legal work, which does not fit within
existing conceptions of legal practice.
David J. Moraine, Loyalty Divided: Duties to Clients and Duties to Others—The Civil Liability
of Tax Attorneys Made Possible by the Acceptance of a Duty to the System, 63 TAX LAW. 169,
181–207 (2009); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Professional Reputation: Looking for the Good Lawyer, 39
S. TEX. L. REV. 549, 562–63 (1998). See generally Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes,
Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 277 (1985); Daniel R. Coquillette
& Judith A. McMorrow, Zacharias’s Prophecy: The Federalization of Legal Ethics Through
Legislative, Court, and Agency Reform, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 123 (2011); Fisher, supra note
10, at 1033–43; Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Obligation To Raise Frivolous Issues in
Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167 (2002); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Reflections on Professional Responsibility in a Regulatory State, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1105 (1995); David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067 (2010).
61. Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes To Include the
Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923 (1996); Major Bernard P.
Ingold, An Overview and Analysis of the New Rules of Professional Conduct for Army Lawyers,
124 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1989); Peppet, supra note 35; Nancy B. Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules:
The Need for a Uniform Code of Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 45 (1998);
Stanley Sporkin, Commentary, The Need for Separate Codes of Professional Conduct for the
Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149 (1993); see STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR
FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION (Acad. of Family Mediators 1998), reprinted in CODES OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 554, 554–58 (Rena A. Gorlin ed., 4th ed. 1999) (family and
divorce mediation); CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (Am.
Arbitration Ass’n 1977), in CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra, at 564, 564–72
(arbitration).
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During the latter half of the twentieth century, the organized bar
both responded to and encouraged the proliferation of quasi-legal
62
work through a new approach to minding its jurisdiction. Whereas
bar leaders once sought clarity in defining, defending, and expanding
the bar’s jurisdiction over new work arising at the boundary between
law and business, they subsequently came to embrace the ambiguity.
Early in the twentieth century, the bar insisted on a sharp
distinction between legal work and other forms of work. Bar
committees vigorously enforced unauthorized-practice-of-law
63
statutes, and the bar promulgated codes of conduct that limited
64
lawyers’ interactions with nonlawyers. Because the vast majority of
legal work occurred in the courtroom or the law firm office, minding
the boundaries of the profession was relatively straightforward. In the
observable and highly regimented setting of courtroom litigation,
where the bar could prevent imposters from engaging in tasks
reserved for lawyers with relative ease, it could persuasively defend
the notion that navigating the intricacies of courtroom procedures
required special training and expertise. In the less public setting of
law firms, the bar could limit nonlawyer involvement by prohibiting
65
nonlawyer ownership and by narrowly prescribing appropriate
communications between lawyers and the limited number of
66
nonlawyers (primarily clients) with whom they interacted.
Over the course of the twentieth century, a proliferation of new
work at the boundary between law and business altered this

62. The processes through which a discipline or profession attempts to distinguish itself
from other disciplines or professions and to claim and defend jurisdiction over particular types
of knowledge and forms of work is referred to by sociologists as “boundary-work.” Professor
Thomas Gieryn developed the concept to describe efforts by scientists to distinguish their work
from other intellectual activities. See Thomas F. Gieryn, Boundary-Work and the Demarcation
of Science from Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists, 48 AM.
SOC. REV. 781, 781–82 (1983). When boundary work involves attempts by a discipline to expand
its authority and jurisdiction over other areas of expertise, professionals attempt to distinguish
their work and knowledge from the work and knowledge of outsiders and to cast outsiders in an
unfavorable light. See id. at 791–92. See generally THOMAS F. GIERYN, CULTURAL
BOUNDARIES OF SCIENCE: CREDIBILITY ON THE LINE (1999). The organized bar has always
engaged in boundary work, generally by highlighting the specialized nature of legal work, the
unique competency of lawyers to engage in that work, and the importance of protecting the
public from incompetent and unethical service providers. See generally PROVINE, supra note 25.
63. WOLFRAM, supra note 27, at 825; Rhode, supra note 17, at 6–11.
64. WOLFRAM, supra note 27, at 826.
65. See CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 34 (1937) (“No division of fees for legal services
is proper, except with another lawyer . . . .”).
66. Id.
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67

landscape. As legal practice and business practice grew together, the
boundary between the two blurred. Legal knowledge became
increasingly enmeshed in business concerns, and a new category of
quasi-legal roles emerged. The bar responded with a new approach to
policing its boundaries, which both reflected and facilitated these
trends. It permitted and even embraced ambiguity, allowing the
question of whether a particular task constituted the practice of law
to turn on the work setting or job title of the person doing the work.
The bar expressed this new approach by pushing legal practice
into new business settings while subsuming new forms of
transactional work within its jurisdiction. For example, it created
exceptions to its fee-sharing prohibitions to allow lawyers to practice
law in not-for-profit corporations, insurance companies, and
68
government agencies. In these new work settings, lawyers performed
69
new kinds of corporate, banking, and regulatory work. Lawyers who
remained in firms began lobbying for their corporate clients and
70
representing them before agencies.
Through these new forms of work, lawyers came into increasing
contact with a wider array of nonlawyers—particularly corporate
actors—outside of the traditional settings of courtrooms and law firm
offices. This shift blurred the distinction between legal work and
business work, raising concerns about the reach of professional
regulations and the strength of professional independence. Corporate
clients began dictating litigation strategies and participating in other
71
activities traditionally characterized as legal practice. Corporate
lawyers, for their part, began participating in business strategy
72
decisions from positions in upper management. Legal scholars have

67. See SCHMIDT, supra note 44, at 13; Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Taking the Business
Out of Work Product, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1869, 1874–81.
68. See Green, supra note 22, at 1152–53; Ted Schneyer, Multidisciplinary Practice,
Professional Regulation, and the Anti-Interference Principle in Legal Ethics, 84 MINN. L. REV.
1469, 1510–14 (2000). Today, lawyers may be employed by nonlawyers or retained by a third
party in a number of circumstances. For example, lawyers may be retained by insurance
companies to represent policyholders, by social service agencies to represent the agencies’
clients, or by the government to represent individuals. Schneyer, supra, at 1507–08.
69. See SCHMIDT, supra note 44, at 13; Nelson, supra note 5, at 357.
70. See SCHMIDT, supra note 44, at 14–15.
71. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 60, at 289–93.
72. Id. at 285–93.
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detailed the ethical problems arising from this trend, but the
74
organized bar has been slow to address them.
Simultaneously, legal knowledge became increasingly relevant to
existing and new business roles. For example, as the regulatory state
grew larger and increasingly complex, demand for lobbyists to draft
75
and advocate legislation steadily increased. In the wake of corporate
scandals, compliance officers became more prevalent and more
76
influential. These and other quasi-legal roles increased in number
and prominence at the boundary of law and business.
Although laypeople routinely performed, and continue to
perform, quasi-legal work, increasing numbers of licensed lawyers are

73. See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, The Ethics of In-House Practice, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE:
ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT, supra note 9, at 197, 205–06 (noting that under the
Model Rules, “[b]usiness matters (even those that might involve immoral but legally permissible
conduct) are not ‘in the lawyer’s province,’” and that “as such, lawyers may stick to the law and
questions of legality (especially when dealing with sophisticated clients)”). Other scholars have
argued for further change, analyzing the benefits of professional collaboration between lawyers
and non-lawyers, especially in the commercial claim-funding context. See, e.g., Michele
DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen or Stone Soup?,
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2795–96 (2012).
74. See Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as
Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1034 (2005) (“[T]he ABA’s 2003 amendments to the
Model Rules . . . ignor[e] the situation of inside counsel by not addressing the ethical ecology of
inside counsel . . . .”).
75. Lobbyists engage in a variety of activities, including drafting and interpreting bills,
preparing and delivering testimony, and recruiting sponsors. The demand for lobbyists
increased as law and administration became more complex with the rise of the regulatory state.
See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Federal Lobbying Regulation: History Through 1954, in
THE LOBBYING MANUAL 5 (William V. Luneburg, Thomas M. Susman & Rebecca H. Gordon
eds., 4th ed. 2009). Formal legal training and licensure are not required to be a registered
lobbyist, but they can be highly valuable.
76. Compliance officers monitor the activities of a company’s directors, officers, and
employees to ensure compliance with governing rules and regulations. The visibility and
prevalence of the role increased dramatically in publicly traded companies in the wake of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF
CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 1.04[5] (8th ed. 2013) (“Among other things, the
[chief governance officer], who is typically a legally trained executive, is responsible for
compliance with certain governance-related laws . . . .”); Robert Eli Rosen, Resistances to
Reforming Corporate Governance: The Diffusion of QLCCs, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1251, 1301
(2005) (“[Compliance officers] . . . have the potential for making directors accountable for
corporate legal compliance decisions.”); Harry Hurt III, Drop That Ledger! This Is the
Compliance Officer, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2005, at B5 (“Sarbanes-Oxley has made chief
compliance officers almost as important to corporate success—or at least survival—as chief
executives and chief financial officers.”). Registered lobbyists are not required to have formal
legal training and licensure, but it is advantageous for those that do.
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77

now occupying quasi-legal roles. They include investment bankers,
compliance officers, consultants, and accountants; they lead hedge
78
funds, banks, private equity firms, and large corporations. With the
collapse in the market for legal services, many young lawyers now
79
enter these quasi-legal roles directly from law school.
The bar could have responded to these quasi-legal roles as it did
when lawyers first moved in-house—by working to extend its
jurisdiction and ethical rules to cover additional work sites, even as it
tolerated the increasing enmeshment of lawyers in the business
80
world. Instead, bar leaders declined to act definitively, neither
bringing quasi-legal work clearly within, nor excluding it clearly from,
the profession’s jurisdiction. As recently as 2003, an ABA committee

77. Of the 2011 graduates who were employed as of February 15, 2013, 17.9 percent were
working in business, and of those jobs, only 29.1 percent were positions for which bar passage
was required. See Class of 2012 National Summary Report, NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. PLACEMENT 1
(July 2013), http://www.nalp.org/uploads/NationalSummaryChart2012.pdf. Of the wider sample
of 2012 graduates whose employment status was known as of February 2013, 22.3 percent were
working in jobs for which bar passage was not required or preferred; 13.3 percent were working
in jobs for which legal training was preferred but not required. See id. NALP reported that these
percentages were the highest it had measured since it began tracking such data in 2001. See
Employment for the Class of 2012—Selected Findings, NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. PLACEMENT 1–2
(2013), http://www.nalp.org/uploads/Classof2012SelectedFindings.pdf. NALP statistics for the
past ten years reveal a steady increase in the number of law graduates who accept jobs for which
legal training is preferred but not required: 13.3 percent of 2012 graduates; 12.9 percent of
graduates averaged over the past two years; 10.8 percent of graduates from the past five years;
and 9.1 percent of graduates from the past ten years. See Recent Graduates, NAT’L ASS’N FOR L.
PLACEMENT, http://www.nalp.org/recentgraduates (last visited Jan. 13, 2014) (linking to
employment statistics of recent graduates for the past ten years).
78. The rate at which lawyers have moved out of practice appears to have increased
considerably. See RENNARD STRICKLAND & FRANK T. READ, THE LAWYER MYTH: A
DEFENSE OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 6 (2008); Joe G. Baker and Brian K.
Jorgensen, Leaving the Law: Occupational and Career Mobility of Law School Graduates, 50 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 16, 16 (2000); Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Law and Leadership, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC.
596, 604–07 (2006); see also Sarah Helene Duggin, The Pivotal Role of the General Counsel in
Promoting Corporate Integrity and Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 989, 1010–
16 (2007) (noting the proliferation of quasi-legal and extralegal roles within large corporations);
David Luban, Asking the Right Questions, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 839, 852–55 (1999) (commenting on
the movement of lawyers out of practice and into business roles); Pater Lattman & Richard
Perez-Pena, Romney, at Harvard, Merged Two Worlds, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2012, at A12
(reporting that “the vast majority of graduates [of Harvard’s joint J.D./M.B.A. program] end up
in business rather than law”). See generally DEBORAH ARRON, RUNNING FROM THE LAW:
WHY GOOD LAWYERS ARE GETTING OUT OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2004).
79. See Class of 2011 National Summary Report, supra note 6; Employment for the Class of
2011—Selected Findings, supra note 6.
80. Licensure is required to work as in-house counsel, and, although the rules of
professional conduct remain indexed primarily to litigation, it is clear that they cover the work
of in-house lawyers. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 35 (1931).
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failed in its efforts to promulgate a model uniform definition of the
81
practice of law. The committee observed “an increasing number of
situations where nonlawyers . . . are providing services that are
difficult to categorize . . . as being . . . within the definition of the
practice of law,” and concluded that it would be impossible to offer a
82
uniform definition. In doing so, the committee effectively blessed
the ambiguity that surrounds the boundaries of legal practice and the
status of quasi-legal work.
Related ambiguity surrounds the coverage of the bar’s ethical
rules. The ABA purports to bind lawyers to all of the Model Rules,
which contain provisions for “law-related services” performed in
83
conjunction with legal services. “Law-related services” are services,
like accounting and financial planning, that do not constitute the
unauthorized practice of law when performed by nonlawyers but that
84
often relate to the provision of legal services. By implication, lawyers
who offer law-related services without also engaging in the practice of
law are not bound by the provisions of the Model Rules. Most, but

81. See AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF
LAW, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2003), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/model-def/taskforce_rpt_328.authcheckdam.pdf. ABA guidance
is not binding unless states adopt it, but the ABA’s efforts with respect to professional
regulation serve as important reference points regarding the approach of the country’s bar writ
large. Here, they evidence the bar’s growing ambivalence toward the scope of practice and the
coverage of the rules of professional conduct.
82. Id. at 13. Early in its work, the committee circulated a draft definition “with the goal of
stimulating discussion.” See id. at 3. It defined the practice of law as “the application of legal
principles and judgment with regard to the circumstances or objectives of a person that require
the knowledge and skill of a person trained in the law.” Task Force on the Model Definition of
the Practice of Law: Definition of the Practice of Law Draft, A.B.A. (Sept. 18, 2002), http://www.
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/task_force_model_definition_practice_law/
model_definition_definition.html. It then listed four activities that presumptively fell within this
definition:
(1) Giving advice or counsel to persons as to their legal rights or responsibilities or to
those of others;
(2) Selecting, drafting, or completing legal documents or agreements that affect the
legal rights of a person;
(3) Representing a person before an adjudicative body, including, but not limited to,
preparing or filing documents or conducting discovery; or
(4) Negotiating legal rights or responsibilities on behalf of a person.
Id. It later abandoned this definition, however, after observing too much variation regarding the
practice of law as among the states. AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION
OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 81, at 4.
83. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (2013).
84. Id.; see, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 678 (1996) (concluding
that divorce mediation constitutes a “lawyer’s services”).
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not all, states adopted this approach. In practice, it generally
exempts licensed lawyers working in quasi-legal roles from being
regulated as lawyers (unless they are simultaneously practicing law).
Notwithstanding its apparent reticence to address quasi-legal
work, the Model Rules also envision application of certain broad
prohibitions to all licensed lawyers, practicing or not. For example,
under Model Rules 8.3 and 8.4, it is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to “commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects,” “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation,” “engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
86
administration of justice,” or fail to report a violation of the
87
professional rules by another lawyer. These provisions purport to
88
bind all licensed lawyers, practicing or not. ABA Formal Opinion
04-433 goes a step further, purporting to bind all licensed lawyers to
89
all provisions of the Model Rules.
States have declined to adopt and implement these approaches,
however. State supreme courts delegate their regulatory authority to
90
state bars, which generally do not concern themselves with the
85. See AM. BAR ASS’N CPR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., VARIATIONS OF THE
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: RULE 5.7 RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING
LAW-RELATED SERVICES (Nov. 2, 2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/migrated/cpr/pic/5_7.authcheckdam.pdf (noting whether each state has adopted Rule 5.7
and, if so, in what form).
86. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT RR. 8.4(b)–(d).
87. Id. R. 8.3.
88. See, e.g., id. R. 8.4 (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . .” (emphasis
added)); see also id. pmbl., para. 3 (citing Rule 8.4 in noting that “there are Rules that apply to
lawyers who are not active in the practice of law or to practicing lawyers even when they are
acting in a nonprofessional capacity”).
89. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-433 (2004) (“‘[A]
lawyer must comply at all times with all applicable disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility whether or not he is acting in his professional capacity.’” (quoting ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 335 (1974))).
90. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-19-31 (2004) (“The license to practice law in this
state is a continuing proclamation by the Supreme Court that the holder is fit to be entrusted
with professional and judicial matters, and to aid in the administration of justice as an attorney
and as an officer of the court. It is the duty of every recipient of that privilege to conduct himself
at all times, both professionally and personally, in conformity with the standards imposed upon
members of the bar as conditions for the privilege to practice law.”); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S.
117, 123–24 (1961) (describing courts’ traditional power to discipline members of the bar,
incident to a “broader responsibility for keeping the administration of justice and the standards
of professional conduct unsullied”); Redball Interior Demolition Corp. v. Palmadessa, 908 F.
Supp. 1226, 1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“A trial judge has the inherent authority to regulate lawyers’
professional conduct.”); In re Integration of Bar of Haw., 432 P.2d 887, 888 (Haw. 1967)

REMUS IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

2/20/2014 4:55 PM

OUT OF PRACTICE

1263
91

conduct and activities of nonpracticing lawyers. Insofar as the ABA
has exhibited ambivalence regarding quasi-legal work, state bar
disciplinary committees have not—they view such work as outside the
scope of professional regulation. On the ground, therefore, licensed
lawyers working in business roles do so free from the strictures of
professional regulation.
Scholars and regulators have given insufficient attention to the
existence and ethical significance of quasi-legal roles, likely because
of the existing models that inform their work. Both the traditional
and segmented models focus narrowly and exclusively on the practice
of law, and fail to recognize and account for other, increasingly
significant forms of lawyers’ work. But neither scholars nor regulators
can continue to ignore the quasi-legal work of licensed lawyers. As I
argue in the next Part, quasi-legal work is the source of significant
ethical tensions that pose imminent threats of harm to clients, the
public, and the independence of the legal profession.
II. THE ETHICAL AMBIGUITY OF QUASI-LEGAL WORK
When licensed lawyers perform quasi-legal work, a number of
dangers arise. In this Part, I highlight three of these dangers: lawyers
may take advantage of consumer confusion and leverage their law
licenses to their own advantage; lawyers may evade ethical
obligations by transitioning into and out of practice; and sophisticated
corporate actors may engage in ethical arbitrage by relying on lawyers
in different roles subject to different obligations for different
purposes. I argue that the cumulative effect of the ambiguity
surrounding quasi-legal work undermines the profession’s mediating

(discussing “the inherent power lodged in the courts . . . with respect to matters affecting the bar
and the practice of law”); see also WOLFRAM, supra note 27, at 22–33 (discussing state and
federal courts’ inherent authority to regulate lawyers in all capacities); Charles W. Wolfram,
Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation—The Role of the Inherent-Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1989) (discussing courts’ inherent power to regulate lawyers).
91. Notwithstanding two exceedingly high-profile examples—Presidents Bill Clinton and
Richard Nixon, both of whom were disbarred—state bars have rarely attempted to regulate
licensed lawyers who were not practicing law or engaging in law-related services. Exceptions
generally entail egregious conduct. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Lazerow,
578 A.2d 779, 779 (Md. 1990) (disbarring a real estate developer after he misappropriated
$200,000 of clients’ escrow funds); In re Discipline of Janklow, 709 N.W.2d 28, 30 (S.D. 2006)
(observing that, among other things, Janklow had been convicted of second-degree
manslaughter); In re Discipline of Hopp, 376 N.W.2d 816, 816 (S.D. 1985) (suspending the
license of an inactive lawyer who was self-employed in the laundry and dry cleaning industry for
convictions related to cocaine use).
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role between state and society, and threatens to shift the profession’s
orientation away from the public and the state and toward private
corporate interests.
A. Consumer Confusion
The first category of ethical tension surrounding lawyers’ quasilegal work is the likelihood of consumer confusion arising among
business customers with whom these lawyers interact. Because the
profession effectively exempts lawyers working in quasi-legal roles
92
from professional regulation, the nature and extent of these lawyers’
ethical obligations are unclear. This ambiguity can confuse
consumers, who may incorrectly assume that because these
individuals are licensed lawyers, they owe professional duties of
confidentiality, loyalty, and care to all consumers. Lawyers and the
businesses that employ them can leverage this confusion to their own
advantage.
The risks are well illustrated by the example of trust officers—a
role for which legal training and licensure are advantageous but not
93
required. Trust officers engage in work that, in some respects,
resembles the work of an estate-planning attorney. They advise
clients on the use of trusts, draft trust instruments, and administer and
manage trust accounts. In other respects, however, trust officers’
work resembles banking work, as they routinely market and sell their
employers’ products and services. For a number of reasons, licensed
and practicing lawyers are particularly attractive applicants for trustofficer positions. Previous experience as a practitioner signals to an
employer that the applicant is already familiar with reading and
drafting trust agreements and with the tax consequences of certain
arrangements. It signals to actual and potential clients that the bank’s
funds are in the hands of individuals with the knowledge and
94
experience to administer the trusts wisely. For these reasons, banks
95
often recruit junior associates at law firms to serve as trust officers.

92. See supra notes 81–91 and accompanying text.
93. See Marshall L. Zissman, Potential Liability of Corporate Fiduciaries for Estate
Planning Errors, TR. & EST., June 1985, 28, 28–29 (summarizing the functions of trust officers).
94. Id.
95. See Ward Bower, Law Firm Economics and Professionalism, 100 DICK. L. REV. 515,
521–22 (1996) (“Banks and insurance companies hire lawyers for estate planning and
administration . . . .”); see also John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary
Practice and the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of
Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 105 (2000) (“[I]nvestment
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When contacted by bank employees about complicated matters
involving legal instruments and issues, clients who know that the
employees are lawyers may think that these lawyers owe lawyerly
duties of loyalty and competency in performing their work. Clients
may reasonably believe, for example, that trust officers who are
lawyers will only market a bank’s estate-planning products and
services that are in the clients’ best interests. The bar’s rules of
professional conduct do not govern trust officers, however, and state
regulations regarding trust officers’ duties to clients vary
96
significantly. In some situations, they may owe fiduciary duties—for
example, after offering financial and investment advice and
97
establishing a formal business relationship. But in other situations,
98
fiduciary duties will not attach —for example, when a trust officer
initially contacts a potential client to market a product or service.
Moreover, when banks market their products and services nationwide
from a variety of different locations, there may be significant
uncertainty as to which jurisdiction’s rules apply.
Amidst this complexity and ambiguity, consumer confusion and
harm are real risks. Without independent legal counsel, even
relatively sophisticated individuals will struggle to sort through the
relevant law and determine the role and duties of a particular lawyertrust officer. Even worse, the resulting confusion may allow both trust
officers and their employing banks or trust companies to leverage
trust officers’ law licenses to increase corporate sales. This
manipulation can then reflect back on and undermine the legitimacy
of the legal profession.
B. Transitions into and Out of Practice
Opportunities for abuse increase when lawyers transition
between practice roles and quasi-legal roles. Scholars have observed

banking firms seem to be hiring many lawyers who offer services to clients in the non-law firm
setting.”).
96. See Ruth Plato-Shinar & Rolf H. Weber, Three Models of the Bank’s Fiduciary Duty, 2
L. & FIN. MARKETS REV. 422, 423–25 (2008).
97. Id. at 423.
98. Annotation, Existence of Fiduciary Relationship Between Bank and Depositor or
Customer so as To Impose Special Duty of Disclosure upon Bank, 70 A.L.R.3d 1344, § 2 (1976 &
Supp. 2013).
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the increasing mobility that characterizes today’s profession.
Overwhelmingly, the scholarship focuses on lawyers’ transitions
100
among law firms or other traditional practice settings. Equally
significant but overlooked are lawyers’ transitions into and out of
legal practice and quasi-legal roles. As legal expertise becomes
increasingly valuable to a range of businesses and employers, lawyers
acquire enhanced flexibility to move between legal practice and
101
business practice. They are now doing so with increasing frequency.
The profession’s regulatory structures do not adequately address
the resulting ethical tensions. Through conflict-of-interest provisions,
the Model Rules address transitions among traditional practice
102
settings, including the special situation of a government lawyer who
103
transitions into private practice. They offer limited guidance,
however, regarding transitions to and from quasi-legal roles. They
address these transitions only indirectly, through broadly applicable
confidentiality and conflict-of-interest provisions. Model Rule 1.6
104
prohibits disclosure of confidential information, and Model Rule 1.9
prohibits use of confidential information gained in a former
105
representation to the detriment of a former client. These narrow
provisions leave room for abuse in the context of quasi-legal work,
where lawyers have no current clients, only former clients. A former
client will face great difficulty in establishing that the lawyer used
information gained during a former representation without disclosing
99. PAULA A. PATTON, THE NALP FOUND., TOWARD EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF
ASSOCIATE MOBILITY: A STATUS REPORT ON ATTRITION 10 (2005); see supra notes 78–79 and
accompanying text.
100. See Heineman, supra note 78, at 604–07 (noting the mobility of lawyers from one career
to the next); Eli Wald, Lawyer Mobility and Legal Ethics: Resolving the Tension Between
Confidentiality Requirements and Contemporary Lawyers’ Career Paths, 31 J. LEGAL PROF. 199,
199 (2007) (noting the mobility of lawyers among traditional areas of practice).
101. See generally ARRON, supra note 78; Baker & Jorgensen, supra note 78.
102. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2013) (addressing transitions between
concurrent representations); id. R. 1.9 (addressing transitions between successive
representations). But see generally Wald, supra note 100 (contending there is unresolved tension
between confidentiality protections and conflicts rules).
103. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.11. To ensure that government lawyers
do not exploit their previous government positions to the advantage of a subsequent client, this
rule prohibits a lawyer from representing a client in a matter in which she personally
participated while working for the government unless the associated government agency grants
permission. See id. (disqualifying the lawyer’s new firm also from representing the client on that
matter unless the lawyer does not participate in the representation and does not receive any fee
from the representation).
104. Id. R. 1.6.
105. Id. R. 1.9(c)(1).
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106

it and without authorization. Moreover, these provisions do not
prohibit a lawyer from using the information in ways that benefit the
lawyer without directly harming the former client—permitting, for
example, the use of information about an adversary that has no
relevance for the former client. This regulatory gap permits lawyers
to leverage insider information to their advantage as they transition
through roles.
A recent federal litigation development illustrates the risk of
harm that can result from such information asymmetries. John
Desmarais left his partnership at the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis in
2010 and opened a patent-licensing company called Round Rock
107
Research (Round Rock). Patent-licensing companies—pejoratively
known as “patent trolls”—represent an entire business model arising
from the quasi-legal zone. These companies typically evaluate and
purchase patents they believe to underpin rapidly developing
technological platforms. They neither perform scientific or
108
technological research nor commercialize products. Instead, they
simply enforce their patents against alleged infringers. Because of the
benefit of legal-practice experience in understanding which patents
have value and are likely to be upheld, lawyers have moved into, and
sometimes become principals of, many patent-licensing firms. John
Desmarais, however, was not content simply to move out of practice.
Concurrent with the founding of Round Rock, he also started a small
law firm, Desmarais LLP, to negotiate Round Rock’s licenses and to
109
litigate its infringement suits.
In 2011, after Round Rock sued Dell Inc. for infringement of a
number of patents, Dell moved to disqualify Desmarais LLP on the
grounds that the law firm could use Dell’s “Confidential—Attorney’s
Eyes Only” information to advance Round Rock’s business
110
position. More specifically, Dell alleged that Desmarais could
acquire information as a practicing lawyer at Desmarais LLP that he
106. Former clients often have trouble satisfying the burden of production required upon
moving for disqualification. See, e.g., O Builders & Assocs., Inc. v. Yuna Corp. of NJ, 19 A.3d
966, 978 (N.J. 2011) (denying a motion for disqualification where a former client’s claims that
“information ‘concerning pending litigation and business matters’ had been disclosed” to an
attorney were “vague[]”).
107. See Jan Wolfe, Round Rock Business Model Comes Under Attack from Dell, CORP.
COUNS. (May 31, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202556654749.
108. See Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 3–4, 43 n.269 (2013)
(discussing characteristics of “patent trolls”).
109. Wolfe, supra note 107.
110. Id.
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could then exploit in his role as chief executive officer of an allegedly
111
independent business. In its motion to disqualify, Dell wrote: “Mr.
Desmarais himself has shown that the risk of such cross-over is very
real, having at least once already provided to Round Rock reverse
engineering information obtained from one client—while wearing his
‘Desmarais LLP’ hat—in order to facilitate Round Rock’s licensing
112
effort against another target.” Dell’s counsel elaborated at oral
argument: based on information gained from conversations with an
opponent in his capacity as a lawyer at Desmarais LLP, Desmarais
broadened the scope of pending patent applications held by Round
113
Rock.
In response, Desmarais agreed to a protective order
screening him from the case and precluding him from working on
114
associated patent applications in the future. Dell’s counsel was not
satisfied, arguing that the risks to Dell were grounds for disqualifying
115
the entire firm from the representation. A Texas district judge
116
denied the request, and the Federal Circuit denied the petition for a
117
writ of mandamus that Dell subsequently filed.
Desmarais’s alleged conduct seems flatly inconsistent with the
professional ideals that justify lawyers’ monopoly power. Desmarais
allegedly leveraged information that he gained in a traditional
practice role (as a partner at Desmarais LLP) to his own advantage in
a quasi-legal role (as chief executive officer of Round Rock). And
yet, the profession’s system of regulation neither prohibits nor deters
118
his conduct.
Desmarais neither disclosed confidential information nor used
information gained during a representation to harm a former client. It
is therefore unlikely that he would be subject to professional
discipline by the bar. Moreover, Dell’s resort to a writ of mandamus,

111. See Round Rock Research, LLC v. Dell Inc., No. 4:11-CV-332, 2012 WL 1848672, at *1
(E.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2011).
112. Wolfe, supra note 107.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Round Rock Research, 2012 WL 1848672, at *3.
116. Id. at *4.
117. In re Dell Inc., 498 F. App’x 40, 44 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
118. As discussed above, see supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text, the Model Rules
comprehensively address transitions among traditional practice settings and into and out of
government service. They offer limited guidance, however, regarding transitions to and from
nontraditional and quasi-legal roles, such as the business role at issue here. They do not speak to
the situation of a lawyer like Desmarais, who is concurrently practicing law at a law firm and
occupying a leadership role of a company that the law firm represents.
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a last-stop procedural device, reveals the reluctance of courts to
intervene to address and deter this type of conduct. Ambiguity
continues to surround these transitions, allowing lawyers like
Desmarais to engage in conduct that, although not technically
prohibited by the rules, is clearly improper—using information gained
in practice for personal gain outside of practice.
C. Ethical Arbitrage
In addition to permitting lawyers to evade professional
regulation, the ethical ambiguity surrounding quasi-legal roles
enables sophisticated corporate actors to engage in troubling forms of
gamesmanship. Corporate actors can manipulate the coverage of the
professional rules to their advantage, relying on lawyers in different
roles for different purposes. In this way, they can manage risk and
liability and access legal expertise subject to as few constraints as
possible.
Corporate management has long engaged in a limited form of
this strategy by selectively relying on in-house counsel for some work
119
and outside counsel for other work. For example, corporate
management may rely on in-house lawyers, who are embedded within
the corporate structure and culture, for legal advice on formulating
business plans and legal strategies. Although they may need outside
counsel to provide third-party opinions that vouch for the legality of
their business plans, they can rely on in-house counsel to determine
the minimal information necessary to disclose to outside counsel to
120
receive a favorable opinion letter. By relying on a source of legal
advice that is not fully independent and a source of independent
evaluation that is not fully informed, sophisticated corporate actors
can co-opt lawyers into facilitating desired business strategies. Often,
they also acquire important defenses and limitations of liability in the
process.
The proliferation of quasi-legal roles allows corporate
management to expand its strategic access to legal expertise under a
119. See Christine Hurt, Counselor, Gatekeeper, Shareholder, Thief: Why Attorneys Who
Invest in Their Clients in a Post-Enron World Are “Selling Out,” Not “Buying In,” 64 OHIO ST.
L.J. 897, 928 (2003) (“Although companies rely on in-house counsel for some functions, they
look to outside counsel in transactions where third-party verification is needed . . . .”); see also
Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 9,
17–21 (2002) (describing the different roles of Enron’s in-house and outside counsel during the
company’s accounting scandal).
120. See Hurt, supra note 119, at 928.
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greater range of conditions and subject to fewer constraints. For
example, management could hire a licensed but nonpracticing lawyer
to serve as a compliance officer. Compliance officers monitor the
activities of a company’s directors, officers, and employees to ensure
compliance with governing rules and regulations. Although the role is
not new, its visibility and prevalence in publicly traded companies
increased dramatically in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
121
122
2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley). Compliance officer positions do not
require specific credentials, but a law license—signaling legal
knowledge and experience—can be highly valuable in the hiring
process. In some companies, including many smaller companies, a
single individual may serve as both general counsel and chief
123
In many other companies, however, the
compliance officer.
compliance function is located outside of, and walled off from, the
124
functions of the general counsel’s office.
If compliance officers are located outside of the general counsel’s
office, management derives the benefits of a lawyer’s expertise and
reputational capital in the compliance role while ceding far less
control than if the lawyer-compliance officer was subject to
125
professional regulation. In contrast to the clear principle that a
corporate lawyer’s loyalty runs to the company as an entity, a
126
compliance officer has vague duties and loyalties. In practice, her
loyalty and reporting obligations likely run to direct superiors in
127
corporate management. And, because a compliance officer is not
121. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
122. KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 76, § 1.04[5]; Hurt, supra note 76.
123. See Hurt, supra note 76.
124. See Rosen, supra note 76, at 1307. For a criticism of this trend toward
departmentalization, see Michele DeStefano, Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why
Departmentalization May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71, 154–67 (2014).
125. Compliance officers are neither bound by the obligations of the legal profession nor
regulated by any other professional or disciplinary body. Pietro M. deVolpi, Jr., Protocols for
the Chief Governance Officer, 10 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 59, 78–80 (2009).
126. See Amy H. Hutchens, Wearing Two Hats: The Dual Roles of In-House Counsel and
Compliance Officer, CONT. MGMT., Feb. 2012, at 18, 21–24 (discussing conflicts between
statutory reporting duties and professional duties of loyalty and confidence).
127. See deVolpi, supra note 125, at 85 (indicating that general counsel and board members
review a Chief Governance Officer’s performance); see also MICHAEL D. GREENBERG,
DIRECTORS AS GUARDIANS OF COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS WITHIN THE CORPORATE CITADEL:
WHAT THE POLICY COMMUNITY SHOULD KNOW 23 (2010), available at http://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2010/RAND_CF277.pdf
(recognizing
that
a
compliance officer reporting directly to the board could create a “mutually enabling
relationship”); Ben Heineman, Don’t Divorce the GC and Compliance Officer, HARVARD L.

REMUS IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

OUT OF PRACTICE

2/20/2014 4:55 PM

1271

subject to the rules of professional conduct, she is free from
affirmative duties to report corporate wrongdoing up the ladder to
128
the board of directors. Given case law suggesting that compliance
129
officers can be terminated at will, she will move beyond her
immediate superior at her own peril. Accordingly, management can
hold the lawyer-compliance officer out to the board and to
shareholders as evidence that it is working proactively to incorporate
legal expertise in all decisionmaking and auditing processes. But it
need not worry—at least not to the extent it might worry with inhouse counsel—that the lawyer-compliance officer will report
corporate wrongdoing up the ladder to the board.
In addition, a compliance officer can engage in conduct in which
in-house or outside counsel cannot engage but that could be helpful
to corporate management. For example, she can interview corporate
employees and other constituents without disclosing that she
represents the organization and without advising them to secure
130
separate counsel.
She can also communicate directly with
131
employees and third parties who have secured separate counsel, and
she need not refrain from giving an impression of disinterestedness to
132
parties who are unrepresented.
In this way, corporate actors can arbitrage the gaps and
ambiguities left by the failure of the current regulatory regime to

SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 26, 2010, 9:53 AM), https://
blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/12/26/don%E2%80%99t-divorce-the-gc-and-complianceofficer (citing “lack of independence” as one of the problems that results from the relationship
between the CFO and supervisor CEO).
128. In-house counsel has a duty under section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley and Model Rule 1.13
to report corporate misconduct and wrongdoing up the ladder and eventually to the board of
directors. See 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2012); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.13(b) (2013).
129. See Sullivan v. Harnisch, 969 N.E.2d 758, 761 (N.Y. 2012) (upholding the firing of a
compliance officer who confronted a company’s chief executive officer with evidence of his
insider trading). Although the whistleblower provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley purport to offer
protection, see 5 U.S.C. § 1221, they have frequently failed to do so in any meaningful way, see
Valerie Watnick, Whistleblower Protections Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Primer and a
Critique, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 831, 860–61 (2007) (arguing that “the convergence of
the at-will employment doctrine and the burden set out for a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower”
will, in practice, “leave the whistleblower largely unprotected”).
130. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 10 (recommending that lawyers
clarify that they represent the corporation and that the constituent may seek independent
counsel).
131. Cf. id. R. 4.2 (requiring a lawyer to communicate only with the lawyer of a represented
individual).
132. Cf. id. R. 4.3 (requiring a lawyer to refrain from giving an impression of
disinterestedness when interacting with an unrepresented party).
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address quasi-legal roles at the boundary of law and business.
Corporations can gather significant information while parting with
minimal control over that information, and they can access legal
expertise that is beholden to them, rather than to corporate boards or
shareholders. All too often, corporate actors do so in furtherance of
excessively aggressive, profit-driven strategies.
When sophisticated corporate actors engage in this form of
ethical arbitrage, they derive a disproportionate share of the benefits
from the legal profession’s monopoly while bearing only a portion of
the corresponding burdens. Certainly, corporate clients bear their
share of the most recognizable burdens of the profession’s
133
monopoly—namely, the rents that inflate the cost of legal services.
But additional burdens from the profession’s monopoly extend
beyond these rents and are borne by other individuals and groups
throughout society. Most notably, they are borne by the large and
growing portion of the population who cannot afford legal services.
Even the lowest-cost legal services, generally found within the
profession’s personal-plight hemisphere, price many individuals out
134
of the market.
As the profession uses its market power in ways that entrench
existing power disparities, low- and middle-income individuals and
less powerful segments of society also bear the burdens of the
profession’s monopoly. Frequently, legal interactions involve
sophisticated corporate actors on one side and individuals and small
businesses on the other. This is often the case when ordinary
individuals enter into service, property, insurance, and employment
contracts. To the extent that the profession is used to the advantage
of corporate actors and at the expense of individuals, it exacerbates
the structural inequalities and problems of collective action that
135
already characterize these interactions.
Finally, society at large bears the costs of the profession’s
monopoly as corporate actors co-opt lawyers into facilitating
excessively aggressive strategies. Lawyers become, at best, pawns in
morally ambiguous corporate strategies, and, at worst, agents of
133. Although a very real cost, monopoly rents are a feature and not a flaw in the system,
which, ideally, ensures high standards of competency and behavior among lawyers.
134. Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 283, 323
(1998).
135. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (discussing the advantages that repeat
players in the legal system have over occasional participants).
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corporate malfeasance. As one corporate scandal after another comes
136
to light, the legal profession’s failure to serve the public and the
137
state by curbing law-breaking behavior becomes more acute. This
trend may foretell the emergence of a new, less prestigious, and likely
less lucrative sphere of corporate work; it may also demonstrate how
an overwhelming orientation toward corporate interests has eclipsed
lawyers’ tripartite duties to clients, the state, and the public.
III. THE PATH AHEAD
The ethical tensions surrounding the work of licensed lawyers in
the quasi-legal zone threaten harm to clients, the profession, and the
public at large. In this final Part, I ask how we can most effectively
address these tensions. I argue that role-based regulation by
corporations or trade organizations would exacerbate the problems
discussed above, whereas carefully tailored mechanisms of
professional regulation could successfully address such problems.
Critical to the path ahead will be acknowledging the inadequacies of
current forms of professional regulation based on existing models of
the profession. The evolving legal landscape requires new forms of
professional regulation, grounded in an empirical understanding of
lawyers’ work and ethical orientations within the quasi-legal zone.
A. The Disadvantages of Role-Based Business Regulation
Industries, trade groups, and/or businesses could adopt ethical
rules to govern individuals working in particular quasi-legal roles—
lawyers and nonlawyers alike. These rules could aim to improve these
136. See, e.g., Alexei Barrionuevo, Two Enron Chiefs Are Convicted in Fraud and
Conspiracy Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at A1 (reporting on the trial of Enron’s chief
executives); Ken Belson, Adelphia Proposes To Settle Federal Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2004,
at C2 (discussing Adelphia’s proposal to settle its cases with the Securities and Exchange
Commission and Department of Justice); Corporate America’s Woes, Continued, ECONOMIST,
Nov. 30, 2002, at 59, 60 (discussing the aftereffects of the Enron scandal on regulations); Simon
Romero & Alex Berenson, WorldCom Says It Hid Expenses, Inflating Cash Flow $3.8 Billion,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at A1 (reporting on WorldCom’s admission that it overstated its
cash flow by over $3.8 billion); Andrew Ross Sorkin & Alex Berenson, Tyco Admits Using
Accounting Tricks To Inflate Earnings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2002, at A1 (reporting on Tyco
International’s admission that it inflated its earnings).
137. See, e.g., Zach Lowe, Lawyer To Serve Six-and-a-Half Years in KPMG Tax Fraud Case,
AMLAW DAILY (Apr. 2, 2009, 11:30 AM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/04/
kpmg-lawyer.html (describing the sentence for the lawyer who wrote approximately six hundred
letters over more than a decade endorsing the tax shelters that KPMG created). See generally
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139 (2005) (explaining how
Enron transactions demonstrate the need for judgment in ambiguous ethical situations).
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individuals’ ethical standards and to address consumer confusion.
They could, for example, articulate appropriate standards of conduct
for all trust officers or all compliance officers. Alone, however,
externally imposed role-based regulation will not resolve, and will
likely exacerbate, the waning independence of lawyers working in
quasi-legal roles.
As an initial matter, regulation by an industry, trade group, or
business would necessarily be controlled by, and beholden to, the
regulated group. Accordingly, as quasi-legal roles proliferate and
licensed lawyers constitute a greater percentage of the quasi-legal
workforce, this type of regulation could initiate a significant cession
of the legal profession’s self-regulatory authority and could further
yield control over lawyers to corporate interests. Moreover, although
new role-based regulations might guard against abuse by individuals
occupying particular quasi-legal roles, they would not prevent
corporate management from continuing to leverage the varying
ethical obligations that attach to lawyers in different roles.
Exclusive reliance on external role-based regulation could also
undermine the checks and balances provided by the profession’s
system of licensure. Lawyers working in regulated quasi-legal roles
could retain their law licenses even in cases of blatant misconduct,
and the threat of disbarment would no longer deter ethical breaches.
This shift would not only eliminate a powerful incentive for lawyers
to avoid extreme misconduct, but also potentially dilute the signaling
138
and credentialing power of a law license.
Indirect regulation through quasi-legal lawyers’ corporate
employers would be similarly problematic. Empirical research reveals
a shift in the allocation of authority within corporate attorney-client
139
relationships. Increasingly, corporate clients take a more dominant

138. Notwithstanding lawyers’ bad reputations in many sectors of contemporary society, a
license to practice law continues to signal training, competence, and core ethical commitments.
If lawyers could retain their law licenses even while violating the codes of conduct for the quasilegal roles in which they were working, licensure would lose its signaling power.
139. See, e.g., Chayes & Chayes, supra note 60, at 277 (“A striking development in the legal
profession over the last decade has been the rapid growth in both importance and size of inhouse, or corporate, counsel.”); Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional
Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503,
526–27 (1985) (concluding on the basis of an empirical study of Chicago lawyers that corporate
lawyers “show such a strong identification with the interests of clients . . . that it is unrealistic to
think of corporate lawyers as neutral professionals who are detached from the substantive
interests of their clients”); see also Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel,
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 958–60 (2005) (“By the 1970s, the general counsel’s position in many
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role in determining legal strategy, whereas corporate lawyers, seeking
to please their clients, view their function as facilitating innovative
140
and sometimes aggressive business strategies. In light of this shift,
entrusting corporate clients with the task of regulating their lawyeremployees holds little promise. Corporate clients would be more
likely to manage and manipulate regulation than to check their
lawyer-employees’ client-focused orientation by encouraging strong
loyalty to the state and the public. Motivated principally by the
entity’s bottom line, corporate clients’ decisionmaking processes
would frequently turn on whether the profits of noncompliance
outstrip the burdens of censure or bad public relations.
Finally, role-based regulation would replicate a fundamental
weakness of the segmented model’s prescription for context-specific
regulation. In both cases, it is impossible to keep pace with all the
new roles that lawyers occupy and the work that they perform.
Accordingly, although efforts to regulate particular quasi-legal roles
may be part of an answer, they cannot be the only answer.
B. The Advantages of Professional Regulation
As a means of conditioning and constraining lawyers’ conduct in
quasi-legal roles, self-imposed professional regulation holds many
advantages over externally imposed business regulation. The
fundamental purpose of professional regulation—ensuring a strong
and independent profession—holds particular force when the central
problem is the growing power and influence of sophisticated
corporate clients. Codes of conduct are typically viewed as means of
constraining undesirable behavior, but they can play an equally
important role in empowering independent and principled behavior.
They stand as a powerful justification for lawyers to exercise their
independent judgment, not only (or necessarily) because they want
to, but also because they may otherwise lose their license. In addition,

large corporations grew in stature and scope of responsibility. . . . General counsel joined senior
management near or at the top of the corporate hierarchy.”).
140. Research confirms that many corporate lawyers increasingly view themselves primarily
as innovators and facilitators, tasked with enabling and effectuating business goals by, for
example, helping to structure beneficial transactions, providing comfort letters as evidence that
corporate actors acted in good faith, and shielding information from discovery through
attorney-client privilege. For a perspective of in-house counsel as value creators, see generally
Omari Scott Simmons & James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers: A Unifying Theory of the In-House
Counsel Role, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 77 (2011). See also Dezalay, supra note 45, at 279–93
(describing business lawyers as “legal entrepreneurs”); Powell, supra note 45, at 423 (same).
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insulating the adjudication structures of professional regulation from
client control helps to ensure that professional norms, rather than
business or other norms, drive disciplinary decisions.
Professional regulation can also be used in unique and, thus far,
unexplored ways to influence corporate clients from within. As noted
above, a troubling implication of the move of lawyers out of law firms
and into the business sector is a shift in authority from lawyers to the
clients and businesses for which they work. But this move also creates
new opportunities for lawyers to shape their clients’ culture and
decisionmaking from within. Empirical research supports the notion
that lawyers can and sometimes do constrain imprudent or illegal
business strategies by, for example, advising conservative approaches
141
to risk tolerance and insisting on proper disclosure. Effective
professional regulation mechanisms can encourage this remedial
orientation by valuing and empowering independent professional
judgment. By requiring lawyers to act in certain ways and offering
them a measure of protection if and when they do, professional
regulation empowers lawyers to check aggressive business strategies
and to influence the decisionmaking processes of the organizations
for which they work.
Opponents may argue that it is inequitable to impose higher
standards on lawyers than nonlawyers in the same quasi-legal role.
This argument ignores the benefits that lawyers derive from their
licenses, even outside of traditional practice settings. In addition to
reputational benefits that flow to licensed lawyers through their
formal connection with the profession, the license also grants lawyers
the flexibility to transition into and out of practice roles at will. To
ensure that lawyers and their corporate employers do not trade
inappropriately on law licenses—and, in doing so, to protect the
profession’s legitimacy and independence—the benefits of licensure
must be accompanied by the obligations of professional regulation.
Moreover, because the license establishes a formal connection
between a lawyer and the bar, licensed lawyers’ conduct reflects back
onto the entire profession’s legitimacy, regardless of whether the
141. See Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs:
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457, 468
(2000) (describing the authors’ interviews with corporate counsel aimed at determining how
frequently these lawyers function in a restraining, as opposed to enabling, role); Christine E.
Parker, Robert Eli Rosen & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, The Two Faces of Lawyers: Professional
Ethics and Business Compliance with Regulation, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 201, 207–14 (2009)
(noting that lawyers often act as compliance monitors).
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attorney practices law. When lawyers in quasi-legal roles engage in
misconduct, the public’s trust in all lawyers diminishes, and without
the public’s trust, lawyers cannot fulfill their roles as mediators
between state and society.
C. Moving Beyond Existing Models
Although professional regulation holds great potential as a
means of addressing ethical tensions in the quasi-legal zone, existing
forms of regulation are inadequate to achieve this potential. As
discussed in Part I, the existing regime is based on the traditional
unitary model of the legal profession and is therefore overwhelmingly
142
directed toward litigation. Proponents of the segmented model
persuasively show this regime’s inadequacies and inability to address
new areas of legal practice.
Significantly, however, even a regulatory regime based on the
segmented model that seeks to tailor the fundamentals of legal ethics
to particular quasi-legal roles would be inadequate. Hybridized quasilegal work rarely fits neatly under the rubric of legal practice. The
fundamentals of legal practice, which include a lawyer’s duties of
loyalty, confidentiality, and care to clients, are generally inapposite to
the context of quasi-legal work, which lacks a client and an attorneyclient relationship to anchor and guide lawyers’ duties and
orientation. Indeed, many ethical tensions surrounding quasi-legal
work arise from confusion regarding the absence of a client to whom
the lawyer owes duties of loyalty, confidentiality, and care. The
profession therefore needs to move beyond existing approaches and
models and to explore new forms of professional regulation.
As an essential first step, the profession should commission
sustained empirical studies to better understand the nature and
challenges of quasi-legal work. Because existing scholarly models
ignore this area of work, we know very little about the roles, pay
levels, backgrounds, and ethical decisionmaking processes of lawyers
engaged in it. We also know very little about the ethical training and
socialization of the growing number of lawyers who begin their
careers in quasi-legal roles rather than in law firms or other
traditional practice contexts. Empirical research will provide an
essential first step for designing an appropriate and effective
regulatory response.

142. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.
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Scholarship on the roles and activities of in-house counsel can
guide us in developing frameworks through which to approach this
regulatory task. Early empirical work tended to view in-house counsel
as either acting as a brake on aggressive strategies—what Professors
Robert Nelson and Laura Beth Nielsen call the “cop” role—or as
promoting gamesmanship to facilitate aggressive strategies—what
143
Nelson and Nielson call the “entrepreneur” role. Subsequently,
commentators began building a more nuanced picture of the roles,
work, and influence of in-house counsel. They asked, for example,
when and under what circumstances in-house counsel take on
144
different roles and orientations toward management and risk. We
should work toward a similarly nuanced understanding of lawyers in
quasi-legal roles to understand the profession’s shifting contours and
to lay the groundwork for more effective regulation.
Concurrently, the profession should use what we do know about
these roles to begin addressing and managing the ethical ambiguity
that pervades the quasi-legal zone. As a first step, the profession
should reexamine its current formulation of the “practice of law.”
Many lawyers in quasi-legal roles engage in work that, when
performed by a lawyer in a different setting, is characterized and
regulated as legal practice. In many cases, clients and customers
believe this work to be legal practice and assume that they are
therefore owed lawyerly duties of confidentiality, loyalty, and care.
Given the confusion, the profession should examine this work and
consider whether it should be regulated as legal practice.
To do so, the ABA and state bars should renew their efforts to
define legal practice more precisely. As discussed above, state bars
currently rely on broad and vague definitions of the “practice of law,”
which generally reference the application of specialized legal
knowledge and judgment to a particular set of facts or
145
circumstances. The resulting ambiguity played a large role in
143. See Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 141, at 468 (defining the “cop” and “entrepreneur”
roles); Parker et al., supra note 141, at 203–04 (reviewing the literature); Tanina Rostain, The
Emergence of “Law Consultants,” 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397, 1398–1400 (2006) (discussing the
rise of lawyers as “law consultants” on business matters).
144. See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 139, at 974 (explaining various roles of general counsel
and highlighting ethical tensions arising out of the interplay among roles); Parker et al., supra
note 141, at 204–05 (offering a quantitative and qualitative study of general counsel in
Australian corporations).
145. See AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF
LAW, supra note 81, at app. A, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/model_def_
statutes.pdf (listing each state’s definition).
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broadening and blurring the boundary between law and business.
Although some ambiguity is inevitable, much can be eliminated
through careful and regular review of particular activities performed
by lawyers and nonlawyers alike (and characterized as legal practice
in the former instance but not in the latter) to determine which, if
146
any, fall clearly within or outside of the profession’s jurisdiction. In
each instance, the risk of harm to consumers, clients, or the public at
147
large should guide analysis and should be weighed against the desire
to open the market for legal services and to reduce prices when
148
possible. For example, a strong argument can be made that when
compliance officers move beyond monitoring and reporting functions
and begin advising employees or corporate management, they are
practicing law. The risk of harm to corporate constituents, who may
unwittingly waive legal rights or compromise legal positions, is great.
But given that compliance officers do not purport to offer these
individuals legal representation, there will be no direct increase in the
costs of obtaining counsel. Rather, these individuals will simply be on
notice that retaining counsel may be advisable.
The goal of an activity-by-activity analysis should be to achieve
greater clarity when possible, while accepting the inevitable
ambiguity of the boundary between law and business. Defining legal
practice broadly, to extinguish the boundary area and to reclassify all
quasi-legal work, would threaten an unwarranted extension of the
profession’s jurisdiction and of its monopoly rents. Defining legal
practice narrowly and business practice broadly would exacerbate the
existing problems of abuse and ethical arbitrage that flow from
insufficient regulation. Accordingly, the goal of regularly revisiting
the definition of legal practice should not be to eliminate the
ambiguity that exists at the boundary of legal practice, but rather to
acknowledge it and, to the extent possible, minimize it.
Second, the profession should develop new and improved forms
of professional regulation, which are tailored to what we currently

146. See Soha F. Turfler, A Model Definition of the Practice of Law: If Not Now, When? An
Alternative Approach to Defining the Practice of Law, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1903, 1951–59
(2004) (proposing an “activity-centered approach” to determining what constitutes the practice
of law).
147. See Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis
of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 440 (2001).
148. See Turfler, supra note 146, at 1911–13 (“[T]he definition of the practice of law directly
influences competition in the legal services market, which in turn has great influence upon the
price of legal services.”).
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know about quasi-legal work’s hybrid nature. New approaches should
take three forms: heightened disclosure requirements, new rules
governing transitions into quasi-legal roles, and new rules creating
baseline conduct standards for all licensed lawyers, practicing or not.
Heightened disclosure requirements should be designed to guard
against consumer confusion. Lawyers in quasi-legal roles regularly
interact with nonlawyers who are not clients. Examples include trust
officers who interact with bank customers and compliance officers
who interact with corporate employees. Confusion frequently
surrounds these interactions as customers and employees may believe
that lawyerly duties attach to the relationship. The bar addressed the
potential for confusion in analogous situations by mandating clear
statements of role and intent. For example, when interacting with
corporate constituents, a corporation’s lawyer must “explain the
identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know that the organization’s interests are adverse to those of the
149
constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.” A lawyer interacting
with an unrepresented individual may not “state or imply that the
lawyer is disinterested,” and, “[w]hen the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the
lawyer’s role in the matter, [she must] make reasonable efforts to
150
correct the misunderstanding.” Lawyers who advertise or solicit
clients must clearly disclose their names and identities, as well as the
151
promotional nature of the communications.
Requiring similar transparency regarding quasi-legal roles could
significantly diminish confusion regarding these lawyers’ duties and
loyalties. Thus, a licensed lawyer working as a trust officer should be
required to explain her position immediately upon contacting a
149. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(f) (2013).
150. Id. R. 4.3.
151. See id. R. 7.1 (prohibiting advertising material that “make[s] a false or misleading
communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services”); id. R. 7.2(c) (requiring that
advertising material “include the name and office address of at least one lawyer or law firm
responsible for its content”); id. R. 7.3(c) (requiring that written, recorded, or electronic
communications from a lawyer soliciting business “from anyone known to be in need of legal
services . . . shall include the words ‘Advertising Material’ on the outside envelope, if any, and at
the beginning and ending of any recorded or electronic communication”); see also Practice
Manual: Advertising and Solicitation: Specialization, Certification, and Practice Limitations,
ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT, http://lawyersmanual.bna.com/mopw2 (last
visited Feb. 15, 2014) (with a subscription, under the heading “Practice Guides” click
“Advertising and Solicitation,” then click “Specialization, Certification, and Practice
Limitations”) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (noting varied requirements by individual
states respecting disclaimers in lawyer advertising).
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potential client and to offer a disclaimer. A compliance officer
performing an internal investigation should be required to explain to
employees that she is not acting in her capacity as a lawyer and has no
special relationship with the employees; rather, her responsibility
flows directly to management. There is some risk that disclosure to
someone who is not already aware of an individual’s status as a
lawyer could exacerbate existing problems by creating heightened
expectations when none previously existed. This risk could be
minimized by ensuring that disclosure entails a sufficiently clear and
comprehensive explanation that heightened expectations are not
warranted. Disclosure requirements such as these would not remove
ethical tensions from lawyers’ roles, but they could guard against the
152
public’s sometimes mistaken and dangerous beliefs.
The profession should also amend its existing rules to address
problems that arise at transition points between practice and quasilegal roles. For example, the provisions governing use of confidential
information should be strengthened. Rather than solely prohibiting
lawyers from using information gained in a representation when use
153
would be detrimental to a (former) client, new provisions should
prohibit lawyers from using information gained in a representation
154
for their own benefit, regardless of the threat of harm to others.
This rule, for example, would prohibit someone in a similar position
to Desmarais from using the information gained in one
representation to leverage an advantage in another.
Finally, and most importantly, the profession should impose and
enforce broad, baseline conduct standards for all licensed lawyers.

152. Cf. Sandra L. DeGraw & Bruce W. Burton, Lawyer Discipline and “Disclosure
Advertising”: Towards a New Ethos, 72 N.C. L. REV. 351, 362 (1994) (proposing a requirement
that “an attorney who has been sanctioned or disciplined for serious misconduct must carry
information concerning such sanction or discipline in his advertising materials”).
153. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(c) (“A lawyer who has formerly
represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a
client in a matter shall not thereafter: (1) use information relating to the representation to the
disadvantage of the former client . . . or (2) reveal information relating to the representation
except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client.”).
154. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (2006) (“An agent has a duty (1) not to
use property of the principal for the agent’s own purposes or those of a third party; and (2) not
to use or communicate confidential information of the principal for the agent’s own purposes or
those of a third party.”); id. cmt. c (“An agent’s use of the principal’s confidential information
for the agent’s own purposes breaches the agent’s duty as stated in subsection (2) although the
agent’s use of the information does not necessitate revealing it. Thus, it is a breach of an agent’s
duty to use confidential information of the principal for the purpose of effecting trades in
securities although the agent does not reveal the information in the course of trading.”).
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Notwithstanding the strong disagreement between proponents of the
traditional and segmented models of the profession, broad, unifying
rules and context-specific regulation need not be antithetical to each
other. Context-specific, role-based regulation holds a place in legal
practice and may be valuable in resolving consumer confusion
regarding quasi-legal roles. Alone, however, it is insufficient to
prevent sophisticated corporate actors from leveraging legal expertise
from different sources who are subject to different ethical
155
obligations. Combining context-specific rules with unifying, baseline
duties that apply to all lawyers could address this latter issue.
Moreover, by encouraging and requiring all licensed lawyers to abide
by certain standards of conduct, these new rules would bolster
lawyers’ independence and empower them to resist manipulation by
corporate actors.
To these ends, the profession may develop several rules over
time. To start, it should implement baseline duties of candor and fair
dealing in business transactions. Currently, many jurisdictions impose
156
157
a duty of fair dealing on bankers and other financial providers.
158
Following these examples and drawing on the fundamentals of

155. See supra Part II.C.
156. See, e.g., Lori J. Henkel, Annotation, Bank’s Liability for Breach of Implied Contract of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 55 A.L.R. 4th 1026, § 2[a] (1987 & Supp. June 2013) (reviewing
cases concluding that a bank’s imposition of excessive service charges could give rise to a cause
of action for a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing); id. § 6[e] (reviewing cases
concluding that “a bank’s wrongful dishonor of a check could give rise to a successful cause of
action for breach of the [duty] of good faith and fair dealing”).
157. See e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 58.16(2)(a)(2)–(a)(3) (2007) (imposing a duty on a mortgage
broker to enter into a contract with the borrower describing whether the broker is to receive
compensation from another source); Grambart v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, Inc., Civ. No. 05-2416,
2006 WL 1072065, at *1 & n.3 (D. Minn. Apr. 21, 2006) (indicating that under Minnesota law, “a
fiduciary relationship exists between a borrower and certain residential mortgage originators”);
Jones v. USMoney Source, Inc., No. 1:99-CV-1522A-JEC, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20400, at *52
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2000) (noting that under Georgia law, a loan broker has a fiduciary duty to a
homebuyer); McGlawn v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 891 A.2d 757, 769 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2006) (finding that a broker violated its fiduciary duty to its customers by engaging in predatory
and unfair brokering activities). As discussed in Part III.A, however, such duties will not be
effective if they attach only to particular quasi-legal roles, rather than to all lawyers engaged in
quasi-legal work.
158. An additional example is provided by New Jersey’s Rule of Professional Conduct 3.2,
which provides broadly that “[a] lawyer . . . shall treat with courtesy and consideration all
persons involved in the legal process.” N.J RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.2 (2014). Some
commentators have interpreted this rule to encompass duties to opposing counsel of “respect,
courtesy and fair dealing, candor in the pursuit of truth, cooperation in all respects not
inconsistent with the client’s interests, and scrupulous observance of all agreements and mutual
understandings.” David H. Dugan III, Mandatory Professionalism: RPC 3.2 and the Lawyer’s
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fiduciary law, jurisdictions should impose an analogous duty on
licensed lawyers. The new duty would require licensed lawyers to act
in good faith in all of their business transactions, promoting
faithfulness to the agreed upon purpose of the transaction and
consistency with the justified expectations of the party with whom the
159
lawyer is transacting.
In addition, Model Rule 4.1, “Truthfulness in Statements to
Others,” should be amended to establish a new duty of candor that
applies to all licensed lawyers. Currently, Rule 4.1 prohibits lawyers,
in the course of representing clients, from “(a) mak[ing] a false
statement of material fact or law to a third person; or (b) fail[ing] to
disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary
to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless
disclosure is prohibited by [the confidentiality provisions of] Rule
160
1.6.” This affirmative duty should be extended in two ways. First, it
should attach to all licensed lawyers, whether or not they engage in
161
client representation. Second, a duty to disclose material facts
should exist not only when necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by a client, but also when necessary to comply with the
lawyer’s duty of fair dealing. Stated otherwise, disclosure should be
required when the information in question is materially relevant to an
interaction or transaction, and when, absent disclosure, the
interaction or transaction could not be viewed as objectively fair.
Some may object that baseline conduct standards that require
candor and fair dealing will create new tension in the lawyer’s role,
particularly in the courtroom context, where justifications for the

Duty To Be Courteous and Considerate, N.J. LAW. MAG., Dec. 2011, at 28, 29. But see id.
(describing these principles as “only admonitions . . . useful reminders of what courtesy and
consideration should look like in the everyday practice of law”).
159. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981) (“The phrase ‘good
faith’ is used in a variety of contexts, and its meaning varies somewhat with the context. Good
faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common
purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party . . . .”).
160. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2013) (emphasis added); see also id. R.
8.4(c) (prohibiting “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” by attorneys).
161. Under some understandings of the profession’s current regulatory regime, this proposal
does not represent a change. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 98(1) & cmt. b (2000) (providing that a lawyer communicating with “a non-client may
not . . . knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to the non-client,” and noting
that “[c]ompliance with those obligations meets social expectations of honesty and fair dealing
and facilitates negotiation and adjudication”). But see Michael H. Rubin, The Ethics of
Negotiations: Are There Any?, 56 L.A. L. REV. 447, 453 (1995) (“Truthfulness and fair dealing
are not required by the Model Rules.” (emphasis omitted)).
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primacy of client-centered duties are at their strongest. But, whenever
there is a client, these new rules will be qualified by duties to the
client. For example, Model Rule 1.6’s duty of confidentiality to clients
162
continues to qualify Model Rule 4.1’s duty of candor. Moreover,
few commentators would dispute that the adversarial excess that
characterizes litigation today harms clients, third parties, and the
public at large. Formulating broad conduct standards that apply
uniformly to all lawyering contexts could productively recalibrate the
balance between lawyers’ duties to clients and others, including the
163
system at large.
Compliance with these overarching rules should be framed as a
cost of the flexibility that a license grants to lawyers to move into, out
of, and among legal practice settings. Whether or not a licensed
lawyer works in a role that requires licensure, she retains the
flexibility to practice if she wishes, so long as she keeps up her license.
Compliance with new conduct floors would therefore constitute an
opportunity cost of licensure. It would be a trade-off for the relatively
greater mobility among workplaces that licensure confers. Breach
would open a lawyer to possible loss of licensure.
Some lawyers may respond to these efforts by simply forfeiting
their licenses or flaunting the rules. But, in both cases, these
individuals would lose the benefit of their license’s signaling function
and the flexibility it offers to reenter practice in the future. Although
they could still use their legal training in problematic ways (such as in
furtherance of corporate wrongdoing), they would no longer be
leveraging a connection to the legal profession nor benefiting from its
reputation for expertise, its heightened ethical standards, and its wellestablished set of obligations, protections, and duties. Moreover, their
problematic conduct would not reflect back on the legal profession,
thereby undermining its legitimacy.
A number of obstacles would undoubtedly stand in the way of
these reforms, including resistance by current participants in the legal
market. The organized bar may seek to maintain ambiguity at its
boundaries—by doing so, it could protect its monopoly while
162. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b).
163. Tension has long characterized the relationships among lawyers’ ethical duties. See
Barry R. Temkin, Misrepresentation by Omission in Settlement Negotiations: Should There Be a
Silent Safe Harbor?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 179, 181 (2004) (noting the long-standing tension
between the lawyer’s duty of zealous advocacy to the client and the duties of candor and fair
dealing with others). The goal is not to eliminate tension but to manage it so as to strike a
desirable balance among duties.
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supporting its members’ flexibility to perform jobs outside of its
jurisdiction. Lawyers working in quasi-legal roles would prefer to
remain free from professional regulation, and sophisticated corporate
clients would prefer to continue leveraging different sources of legal
expertise, some subject to professional regulation and some not.
Meanwhile, the parties likely to support these reforms may be
poorly positioned to do so. Many of the unsophisticated individuals
who could be harmed by confusion over lawyers’ roles would lack
sufficient knowledge or resources to object. And the shareholders and
amorphous public who would be harmed by excessive market risk and
corporate malfeasance would probably be too diffuse to act.
These obstacles do not preclude reform, but rather suggest that
state courts must play a central role in achieving change. In many
states, excessively close ties with state bars have compromised state
courts’ ability to serve as a check on lawyers and bar associations’
164
self-interest. However, state courts have a responsibility to serve the
public and, in furtherance of that responsibility, should reclaim some
of the regulatory authority and responsibility that they delegated to
state bar associations. They could do so by designating task forces to
develop and study proposals for specific rules and, ultimately, by
adopting new rules.
As the organized bar begins exploring new forms of regulation,
the legal academy should pursue educational reform to prepare law
students for the ethical challenges of the contemporary business
world. At the very least, law schools should incorporate the ethics of
quasi-legal work into the curriculum and alert students to the ethical
challenges of transitioning into and out of quasi-legal roles. With
many new lawyers transitioning directly into quasi-legal work,
professional ethical norms must be imbued during law school if they
are to be shared by all licensed lawyers.
CONCLUSION
Lawyering has changed dramatically in the past century, but
scholarly and regulatory models have failed to keep pace. These
models ignore significant and expansive social dynamics that
broadened and blurred the boundary between law and business.
Within the resulting quasi-legal zone, lawyers and their clients can

164. See Dana Ann Remus, Just Conduct: Regulating Bench-Bar Relationships, 30 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 123, 156 (2011).
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promote ambiguity about the nature of lawyers’ work and ethical
obligations. Corporate clients can then leverage lawyers in different
roles and subject to different ethical obligations to their advantage.
These changes have eliminated balance in the profession’s
tripartite orientation toward clients, the state, and the public. In its
place, they have allowed the corporate sector to derive a
disproportionate share of the benefits from the profession’s
monopoly while the state and the public bear a disproportionate
share of the burdens. Eliminating professional regulation would only
exacerbate this imbalance. Instead, we should recalibrate professional
regulation to address the particular challenges faced by licensed
lawyers in quasi-legal roles.
There is room as well as need for broad ethical principles,
context-specific regulations, and better rules governing moves among
165
contexts. Although neither existing model is alone sufficient, both
offer important insights. By combining the two models, the profession
can address the risks of harm arising at the profession’s edges. It can
take an important step in codifying and enforcing the profession’s
highest aspirations, and in allowing the public and the state to extract
the full benefit of the bargain of professional regulation. Accordingly,
instead of focusing exclusively on factors that draw licensed lawyers
apart, as the current literature does, we should begin the difficult
discussions of what core principles bind licensed lawyers together.

165. Professor Anthony Kronman and others have suggested that a renewed commitment to
high standards for lawyers cannot be pursued through the rules of professional conduct. Any
such efforts, they contend, result in mere mechanical applications and arbitrage of rules that
insufficiently instill and enforce ethical conventions. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE
LOST LAWYER 365 (1993); DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 9 (2007);
WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 138 (1998). Conversely, I seek ways in which
ethical principles may be incorporated within the rules as the unifying ethical platform of
licensed lawyers. Such an approach has the advantage of raising ethical standards for the entire
bar while allowing for the adoption of specific contextual rules called for by Wilkins and other
commentators.

